{"id":4137,"date":"2013-09-21T15:26:08","date_gmt":"2013-09-21T19:26:08","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.robertmprice.mindvendor.com\/zblog\/?p=4137"},"modified":"2013-09-21T18:50:28","modified_gmt":"2013-09-21T22:50:28","slug":"4137","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/www.robertmprice.mindvendor.com\/zblog\/4137\/","title":{"rendered":"No God, No Good?"},"content":{"rendered":"
\"\"
Mary Midgley, English moral philosopher
Born September 13, 1919<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

The other week, a variegated bunch of friends crowded into our living room for our Heretics Anonymous discussion group. They were exchanging opinions sparked by my presentation of quotes from Mary Midgley\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s book Wickedness<\/em>. I could hardly believe it! We were actually sticking to the topic! It used to take us about two minutes to stray from (really, to veer off) the path! But I guess people always like to discuss morality. After all, that\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s a lot easier than living<\/em> morality.<\/p>\n

Well, anyway, eventually religion had to come up. I prize very highly the diversity of our group. There is a fair number of atheists and agnostics, but there are also a traditionalist Catholic or two, as well as an evangelical Protestant. This man and I disagree diametrically when it comes to religion, though all our discussions of it are enjoyable and enlightening. He and I agree very closely when it comes to politics. How can that be? How could we start from such divergent theoretical positions and wind up so close together on the issues?<\/p>\n

My friend John hurled the challenge to us atheists and humanists: how could we have any moral standards at all without a belief in God as a transcendent law-giver? Without such a metaphysical North Star, wouldn\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t any ethical opinion amount to mere subjectivity? Mere preference? And then why say that Hitler was \u00e2\u20ac\u0153wrong\u00e2\u20ac\u009d? On what basis can we say any more than that we happen not to like his antics? Of course, John wasn\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t charging that we had<\/em> no moral standards, just that we seemed not to have a theoretical basis<\/em> for it, or right to it. This good question comes up very frequently, as it should. It always has. Dostoyevsky said, \u00e2\u20ac\u0153If there is no God, then all things are permitted\u00e2\u20ac\u009d (which forms the premise of the movie Psycho III<\/em>). Is that true?<\/p>\n

Nahh. Here\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s why.<\/p>\n

First, let\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s get one thing straight. If right and wrong are dependent upon the dictate, the sheer will (which is to say the whim) of God, then we have the very moral nihilism feared by theists who warn us that morality is arbitrary without a deity to define and to decree it. In the same way, we must reject the Presuppositionalist argument that there could be no logic if God did not create it. If either logic or ethics is determined extrinsically by divine say-so, as when someone at Parker Brothers invents a new board game and stipulates the rules, then<\/em> the whole thing is arbitrary. If God were to decide tomorrow that rape and murder would be deemed righteous acts tomorrow (and Frankist theology did<\/em> pretty much say this), why then, they would<\/em> be. Or if God decided that A would henceforth be the same as non-A, then that would be the way of things, \u00e2\u20ac\u0153the new normal,\u00e2\u20ac\u009d until he decided to shake things up again.<\/p>\n

This is called \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Divine Voluntarism\u00e2\u20ac\u009d or \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Divine Command Theory.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Theists are uneasy about this, but they don\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t like the other horn of the dilemma either, which would be to posit that God decrees what is already right, forbids what is already wrong. God does not make the deeds right or wrong but rather knows what good and evil already are. But this means he obeys standards that he did not create, and to which he is subordinate.<\/p>\n

(The \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Intelligent Design\u00e2\u20ac\u009d creationists have the same problem: they imagine an \u00e2\u20ac\u0153almighty\u00e2\u20ac\u009d creator who must accommodate his creative acts to already-established physics parameters.)<\/p>\n

\"Immanuel<\/a>
Immanuel Kant<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Theists try to sidestep the dilemma by maintaining that God simply is\u00c2\u00a0<\/em>good(ness), so that he is just acting (and decreeing) in accord with his own nature. But this does not work. It is a case of what Derrida called \u00e2\u20ac\u0153the supplement of copula.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d This is when you try to span a gap by trying to say both facing cliffs are really the same one, so that you don\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t need to get across; you are already there! Baloney. To see this, you only need to remind yourself of the difference between synthetic<\/em> and analytic<\/em> judgments. (You were just reading Kant the other day, right?) An analytic judgment is a tautology, mere definition: a bachelor is an unmarried man. Nothing new is being predicated of \u00e2\u20ac\u0153a bachelor.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d \u00e2\u20ac\u0153An unmarried man\u00e2\u20ac\u009d is simply what we mean<\/em> by \u00e2\u20ac\u0153a bachelor.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d By contrast, if we say, \u00e2\u20ac\u0153A bachelor is a happy man,\u00e2\u20ac\u009d we are saying something new about our bachelor. This would be a synthetic judgment, adding one fact to another.<\/p>\n

Okay, if we say, \u00e2\u20ac\u0153God is<\/em> good,\u00e2\u20ac\u009d it will be either an analytic or a synthetic judgment. In the first case, we are saying, \u00e2\u20ac\u0153good\u00e2\u20ac\u009d is just a synonym for God and adds nothing new. \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Good\u00e2\u20ac\u009d means \u00e2\u20ac\u0153whatever God is.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d We are back to Divine Voluntarism. But if we say it is a synthetic judgment, we are predicating of God something not<\/em> already contained in the definition of God. And that means we have already defined \u00e2\u20ac\u0153good\u00e2\u20ac\u009d and decided that God can be characterized as one who obeys the law of goodness.<\/p>\n

Thomas Aquinas mapped the way out of the labyrinth. He said God created a particular kind of world, populating it with a particular kind of creatures, with particular needs. We are social animals. We require each others\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 help, nurture, protection, and respect. We require a stable society without the constant threat of terror, rape, theft, murder, etc. Thus these acts are ruled out for purely pragmatic reasons. We classify them as \u00e2\u20ac\u0153wrong,\u00e2\u20ac\u009d \u00e2\u20ac\u0153immoral,\u00e2\u20ac\u009d \u00e2\u20ac\u0153evil.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d And \u00e2\u20ac\u0153we\u00e2\u20ac\u009d includes all cultures worldwide and throughout history. There have never been societies which countenanced such deeds. No coincidence, because human nature is everywhere the same. Sure, there are secondary matters on which societies have differed, but that\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s the point: they\u00e2\u20ac\u2122re secondary, varying according to accidents of environment and tradition. For instance, all cultures consider adultery wrong, but it is defined differently depending on how a society defines marriage.<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/a>
Thomas Aquinas<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Aquinas said, then, that good and evil are anything but arbitrary given the conditions of the specific world God created. They are necessary to wholesome, fruitful, secure social existence. Those who threaten to unravel society must be fended off: imprisoned, reeducated, executed, defeated in war. Up to this point all this is pretty much a social contract model.<\/p>\n

But what makes it morally culpable<\/em> for Charles Manson, Jeff Dahmer, or Baby Face Nelson to decide, \u00e2\u20ac\u0153To hell with the majority! I\u00e2\u20ac\u2122m doing what I please!\u00e2\u20ac\u009d From our standpoint, we have to try to stop them. But that would be a matter of power relations. What gives people the moral duty<\/em> to protect the wholesome interests of the majority? That, Aquinas explained, is where the will of God comes in. He is our creator, and we owe him obedience. To switch over to Kant\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s categories again, Aquinas would be saying that God\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s having created us introduces a categorical imperative<\/em> for us to obey the laws. If not for that, we would have only a \u00e2\u20ac\u0153hypothetical\u00e2\u20ac\u009d or \u00e2\u20ac\u0153prudential\u00e2\u20ac\u009d imperative to keep the law. A hypothetical imperative is just a matter of the best strategy. \u00e2\u20ac\u0153If you want that job, you\u00e2\u20ac\u2122d better dress for success.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d \u00e2\u20ac\u0153If you want to get a passing grade, you\u00e2\u20ac\u2122d be well advised to do some studying.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d \u00e2\u20ac\u0153If you want to get there quickly, I\u00e2\u20ac\u2122d suggest the highway.\u00e2\u20ac\u009d But if you don\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t, then who cares? It has nothing to do with morality.<\/p>\n

Insofar as we want a stable, workable society, we will outlaw rape, murder, theft, etc., and punish or eliminate transgressors. This will be a hypothetical imperative. If there is no creator God, there is no categorical imperative. But does that make much difference? Who really needs a convincing philosophical argument that rape is immoral? Is there anyone who is waiting to make up his mind on the issue till the debates are concluded? Do we have to prove to Nazis that they are wrong before we go to war against them?<\/p>\n

Pyrrho and the ancient Skeptic philosophers were right, it seems to me: you just don\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t need definitive certainties to get along in life. Pragmatics and probabilities seem to be sufficient rules of thumb.<\/p>\n

Not that anyone is in any better position. Those who tell us that without God we have no right to morals are by no means able to prove there is<\/em> such a metaphysical anchor. They have painted themselves into a corner, and they just try to escape by means of a flying leap. \u00e2\u20ac\u0153I need a metaphysical guarantee? Okay, I\u00e2\u20ac\u2122ve got<\/em> one! God!\u00e2\u20ac\u009d But saying doesn\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t make it so.<\/p>\n

So says Zarathustra<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The other week, a variegated bunch of friends crowded into our living room for our Heretics Anonymous discussion group. They were exchanging opinions sparked by my presentation of quotes from Mary Midgley\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s book Wickedness. I could hardly believe it! We … Continue reading →<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4137","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.robertmprice.mindvendor.com\/zblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4137","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.robertmprice.mindvendor.com\/zblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.robertmprice.mindvendor.com\/zblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.robertmprice.mindvendor.com\/zblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.robertmprice.mindvendor.com\/zblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4137"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"http:\/\/www.robertmprice.mindvendor.com\/zblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4137\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.robertmprice.mindvendor.com\/zblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4137"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.robertmprice.mindvendor.com\/zblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4137"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.robertmprice.mindvendor.com\/zblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4137"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}